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INTRODUCTION

Today the specter of employment-related claims l haunts cor
porate board rooms throughout the country. The pervasiveness of
such claims, and the large awards that have been made to claim
ants,2 have led employers of all types to seek insurance coverage for
employment-related claims under many different types of liability
policies. Corporate policyholders often mistakenly assume that
they must bear the full costs of the defense and liabilities of an em
ployment-related suit. In fact, when applying policy language and
well-established rules of insurance law, many courts have found in
surance coverage for defense costs or liabilities associated with em

* James E. Scheuermann and John K. Baillie are attorneys at the law firm of
Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where they counsel and liti
gate on behalf of policyholders concerning insurance coverage matters. This Article
reflects the views of the authors as to the identification of important issues in third
party liability coverage for employment-related claims but does not necessarily reflect
their views as to the resolution of these issues. Moreover, this Article does not neces
sarily reflect the views of any client of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, LLP, or the firm itself.
Portions of this chapter previously appeared in James E. Scheuermann, Insurance
Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 28 TORT & INS. L. J. 778 (1993), and in
James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Liability Insurance for Employment-Related
Claims, in llB THE LAW OF LlABlUTY INSURANCE (Rowland H. Long ed. Matthew
Bender 1995). Both of these articles comprehensively discuss liability insurance cover
age for employment-related claims. The portions that appeared in THE LAW OF LIABIL·
ITY INSURANCE are reprinted with the permission of Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. ©
1995. All rights reserved.
1. As used in this Article, "employment-related" generically refers to liabilities,
acts, or claims arising in connection with employment discrimination, wrongful termina
tion, constructive discharge, sexual harassment, and similar conduct. It does not refer
to liabilities and claims for work-related injuries that may be covered under workers'
compensation statutes.
2. See, e.g., Shoney's Inc.: Judge Approves Settlement of Racial Bias Lawsuit,
WALL ST. J., January 26,1993, at B4 (reporting that a U.S. district court judge approved
a $105 million settlement in a racial discrimination suit against Shoney's, Inc.).
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ployment-related claims under liability insurance policies, including
commercial general liability ("CGL") insurance policies? employ
ers' liability ("EL policies" or "EL coverages"), as well as errors
and omissions ("E&O") insurance policies.
This Article examines the key issues that arise under EL and
E&O insurance coverages in the specific context of employment
related claims. The following section focuses on the five principal
issues that arise under a typical grap.t of EL insurance coverage and
examines two exclusions that are often included in EL policies and
which are of special importance in the employment-related claims
context. Section III examines three key issues that arise under
E&O policies in the context of employment-related claims.
I.

COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CLAIMS
UNDER EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY POLICIES

EL coverages are intended to complement both Workers'
Compensation ("WC") coverages4 and general liability insurance
coverages. A classic description of the interlocking and comple
mentary nature of these coverages is found in Federal Rice Drug
Co. v. Queen Insurance CO.:5
The insuring agreements of the Workmen's Compensation and
Employer's Liability Policy are designated to meet the situation
created by the commonly enacted workmen's compensation stat
utes. Under most of these statutes an employee has a theoretical
election either to be covered by the statute, thereby obtaining the
benefit of its absolute liability but accepting its limitations on
payment, or to reject coverage and rely on the employer's com
3. For an examination and analysis of issues arising in this context under a variety
of liability insurance policies, see James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Liability
Insurance for Employment-Related Claims, in THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
(Rowland H. Long ed., Matthew Bender 1995).
.
4. Workers' compensation schemes generally provide cash benefits to eligible em
ployees that are injured accidentally on the job and are unable to work as a result, and
to recompense them for their lost wages and medical benefits. Typically, the remedy
provided by the applicable workers' compensation scheme is the only remedy that an
employee may seek against his employer for injuries that are covered under that
scheme. In many states, employers are required or permitted to fund potential work
ers' compensation liabilities by purchasing Workers' CompensationlEmployers' Liabil
ity ("WC/EL") insurance policies. 7B J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4571 at 4-5 (West 1979 & Supp. 1994). Employees' claims of negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress are preempted by the workers' compensation system in
some states. E.g., La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048 (1995).
5. 463 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1972) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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mon law liability. Coverage A of the standard Workmen's Com
pensation and Employer's Liability Policy insures against liability
to those employees who elect for Workmen's Compensation Act
coverage ... Coverage B of the Workmen's Compensation and
Employer's Liability Policy insures against liability to employees
who would be covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act ex
cept for the fact that they elected against coverage. That this is
the case is clear from the use of the language "arising out of and
in the course of his employment." These words ... are those
used in the workmen's compensation statutes of a majority of the
states. The same language is used in exclusion (g) of the insurer's
Comprehensive Business Policy, and undoubtedly is intended to
have the same meaning. We read exclusion (f) to exclude liabil
ity to covered employees electing for workmen's compensation
and exclusion (g) to exclude liability to covered employees elect
ing against workmen's compensation and we read the exclusions,
therefore as coextensive. Together they are intended to exclude
only such claims as would fall within the coverage of a standard
Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy.6

In Federal Rice, the estate of a fonner employee of the insured
who, "committed suicide in the insured's place of business by hang
ing himself" two weeks after his dismissal, sued the employer for
wrongful death, alleging that the insured's president had, over the
course of three years, harassed and humiliated -the deceased em
ployee to such an extent that his emotional distress deprived him of
the capacity to govern his own conduct and resist an insane suicidal
impulse? The employer sought coverage under its comprehensive
business insurance policy, but its insurer denied coverage based on
the policy's employers liability exclusion and workers compensation
exclusion. 8 The court described the complementary and interlock
6. Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted).
7. See id. at 627-28.
8. Id. at 628. The specific grant of coverage at issue in Federal Rice provided:
COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY LIABILITY:
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le
gallyobligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death at any time reSUlting therefrom, sustained by any person [and
caused by accident].
Id.

The bracketed language was deleted by an endorsement to the policy. The exclu
sions at issue in Federal Rice barred coverage:
(f) under coverage A, to any obligation for which the insured or any carrier as
his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation, unemploy
ment, compensation or disability benefits law, or under any similar law;
(g) under coverage A, except with respect to liability assumed by the insured
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ing nature of these coverages9 and hinged its coverage analysis on
whether the underlying claim would be cognizable under the appli
cable workers' compensation law: "If it would, there is no cover
age. If it would not, neither exclusion (f) nor exclusion (g) applies,
and there is coverage under Coverage A of the insuring agree
ments. "10 The court found that exclusions did not bar coverage for
the underlying claim because the emotional distress which allegedly
caused the employee's suicide was not an "accident," and thus not
covered under the applicable workers' compensation law.!1
A.

The Scope of the Coverage Grant

EL coverage typically provides, "[the insurer will] pay on be
half of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury by accident or
disease ... sustained ... by any employee of the insured arising out
of and in the course of his employment."12 EL policies may also
include a defense obligation, created by language such as the fol
lowing: "We have the right and duty to defend, at our expense any
under a contract as defined herein, to bodily injury or to sickness, disease or
death of any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of em
ployment by the insured.

ld.
9. The Federal Rice court reviewed "standard" WC and EL grants of coverage for
the purposes of comparison with the WC and employment exclusions in the policy at
issue. The "standard" WC grant of coverage quoted by the court provided:
COVERAGE A - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
To pay promptly when due all compensation and other benefits required of
the insured by the workmen's compensation law.
Id. at 629 n.2. The "standard" EL grant of coverage quoted by the court provided:
COVERAGE B - EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le
gally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury by accident or dis
ease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained in the United
States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada by any employee of
the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured
either in operations in a state designated in item 3 of the declarations or in
operations necessary or incidental thereto.
Id. at 629 n.3.
to. ld. at 630.
11. Id. at 630-31.
12. See, e.g., Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 970, 979
(6th Cir.) (alterations in original) (construing Ohio law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 190
(1994); cf Commercial Union Insurance Company, Workers Compensation and Em
ployers Liability Insurance Policy WC 00 ()() ()() A at 2 (August 1991) (providing cover
age for "bodily injury" that "arise[s] out of and in the course of ... employment,"
subject to a number of other terms and conditions) [hereinafter Commercial Union
Policy].
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claim, proceeding or suit against you for damages payable by this
insurance."13
These coverage grants give rise to five principal issues in the
context of employment-related claims: (i) what qualifies as "bodily
injury"; (ii) whether the acts giving rise to employment-related
claims qualify as "accidents"; (iii) whether the amounts assessed
against employers as the result of such claims are "damages"; (iv)
who qualifies as an employee of the insured; and (v) whether em
ployment-related claims "arise out of and in the course of
employment. "
1.

Bodily Injury Coverage

Sample form EL policies do not define the key policy term
"bodily injury."14 Accordingly, under hornbook rules of construc
tion, the term should be given its common ordinary meaning, and
any vagueness, confusion, or ambiguity arising out of the failure to
define the term should be resolved in favor of coverage for the poli
cyholder.15 Since EL policies use the term "bodily injury" in their
coverage grant in a manner similar to that of the standard-form
Comprehensive or Commercial General Liability ("CGL") insur
ance policies, a review of the issues arising under the "bodily in
jury" coverage of CGL policies is instructive.
In the 1993 revisions to the standard form CGL insurance pol
icy "bodily injury" is defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease
sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at
any time."16 Many of the allegations of an employment-related
complaint typically will not fall within the bodily injury coverage,
e.g., allegations of breach of contract. The most common issue
under a "bodily injury" coverage provision in employment-related
coverage actions is whether emotional or mental distress is within
the scope of "bodily injury" when there are no accompanying physi
cal symptoms.
Policyholders in employment-related coverage cases and other
13. Commercial Union Policy, supra note 12, at 3 (August 1991).
14. Id.
15. 13 J. ApPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcrICE, §§ 7384 at 70-74, 7401 at 197,
219-27 (West 1976).
16. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
CG 00 01 10 93 (1993), reprinted in S. MILLER & P. LEFEBVRE, I MILLER'S STANDARD
INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 417 (1986 & Supp. 1994). The definition of "bodily
injury" in the 1973 ISO standard form Comprehensive General Liability insurance pol
icy, which is the subject of most of the case law, is materially identical. See id. at 451.2.
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coverage cases often argue that the bodily injury coverage includes
claims for infliction of emotional or mental distress, even if not ac
companied by physical symptomsP This strategy may be worth
pursuing in an employment-related coverage -action, even when
emotional or mental distress claims do not represent significant lia
bilities for a policyholder. The potential for coverage for a claim of
emotional or mental distress under the bodily injury coverage will
typically activate the policy's broad duty to defend,18 which may
involve coverage for significant defense costs.
Many courts, including the highest courts of New York and
South Carolina, have found the policyholders' position persua
sive.1 9 A slightly greater number of courts have rejected the policy
holders' position and have held that purely emotional or mental
distress claims are not within the bodily injury coverage. 20
17. E.g., Lavanant v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 79 N. Y.2d 623, 595
N.E.2d 819 (1992) (holding that purely emotional injuries sustained by tenants as a
result of ceiling collapse were covered under landlord's general liability policy).
18. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co., 894 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1990)
(applying Mississippi law and stating that under an EL policy the insurer's duty to de
fend is triggered if there is any possibility of coverage under the allegations of the com
plaint against the insured).
19. Lavanant, 79 N.Y.2d 623,595 N.E.2d 819 (1992); County of Chemung v. Hart
ford Casualty Ins. Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. Super. Q. 1985); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 297 S.c. 71, 374 S.E.2d 896 (1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Biggerstaff,
703 F. Supp. 23 (D.S.C. 1989) (S. Carolina law); Ornark Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am., 590 F. Supp. 114 (D. Or. 1984) (Oregon law); Morrison Assurance Co. v. North
Am. Reinsurance Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (Alabama law), affd, 760
F.2d 279 (11th Cir. 1985); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. McGuire Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal
Ct. App.), rev. denied (1991); Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal Ct.
App.), rev. denied (1985); Bloodworth v. Carroll, 455 So. 2d 1197 (La. Ct. App. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 463 So. 2d 1313 (La. 1985); Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v.'
Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 594 A.2d 1079 (Me. 1991) (finding a duty to defend even
though Maine law requires physical symptoms accompanying alleged emotional distress
and complaint did not allege accompanying physical symptoms, on grounds that under
lying plaintiff may prove such physical symptoms at trial); Loewenthal v. Security Ins.
Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436 A.2d 493 (1981).
20. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. First Interstate Bancsystems, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 917 (D.
Mont. 1988) (applying Montana law); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Isle of Wight, 673 F.
Supp. 760 (E.D. Va. 1987) (applying Virginia Law); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Campbell County Sch. Dist. No.1, 612 F. Supp. 285 (D. Wyo. 1985) (applying Wyoming
law); Rolette County v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 452 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.D. 1978)
(North Dakota law); Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 244 Ga. 456, 260 S.E.2d 860
(1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654,518 N.E.2d 1154 (1988); Greenman
v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 173 Mich. App. 88,433 N.w.2d 346 (1988); National Ben
Franklin Ins. Co. v. Harris, 161 Mich. App. 86, 409 N.W.2d 733 (1987); Artcraft of N.H.,
Inc. v. Lumberman'S [sic] Mut. Casualty Co., 126 N.H. 844, 497 A.2d 1195 (1985); SL
Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188, 607 A.2d 1266 (1992) (but
holding that ambiguity of "bodily injury" requires a case-by-case analysis of underlying
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of the cases holding that
"bodily injury" does not encompass emotional or mental distress
when unaccompanied by any physical symptoms is that they rewrite
the definition of "bodily injury." They equate "bodily" with "physi
cal," and, moreover, read "bodily" as modifying. "sickness" and
"disease," as well as "injury." "Bodily injury" is thus rewritten to
mean "physical injury, physical sickness, or physical disease."21
The plain language of the definition, however, does not use the
term "physical" and uses "bodily" only to modify "injury." As the
highest court of New York held, "[w]e decline [the insurer's] invita
tion to rewrite the contract to add 'bodily sickness' and 'bodily dis
ease' .... [The insurer] could itself have specified such limitations
in drafting its policy, but it did not do SO."22 Rather, read as plainly
written, "[t]he categories 'sickness' and 'disease' in the insurer's
definition not only enlarge the term 'bodily injury' but also, to the
average reader, may include mental as well as physical sickness and
disease."23
The same result is required by the plain and ordinary meaning
of the terms in the definition of "bodily injury" and well-established
rules of insurance policy construction. Common definitions of
"sickness" and "disease" are broad enough to encompass purely
mental or emotional illnesses or distress and not limited to physical
sicknesses or diseases. "Sickness" is commonly broadly defined as
"illness ... a weakened and disordered state of anything"24 or "in
firmity ... indisposition ... malaise."25 Similarly, "disease" is com
monly defined as "distress ... any departure from health; illness in
general"26 or "distemper . . . derangement . . . breakdown."27
Under the well-established rule of construction that undefined pol
icy terms are to be given their common, ordinary meanings,28
purely emotional distress claims should fall within either "sickness"
or "disease" or both.
facts}; E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wash. 2d 901, 726
P.2d 439 (1986).
.
21. E.g., Rolette County, 452 F. Supp. at 130; Diamant, 401 Mass. at 658 n.3, 518
N.E.2d at 1157 n.3; Artcraft, 126 N.H. at 846,497 A.2d at 1196; E-Z Loader Boat Trail
ers, 106 Wash. 2d at 908,726 P.2d at 443.
22. Lavanant, 79 N.Y.2d at 629, 595 N.E.2d at 822.

23. ld.
24.
25.
26.
27.
1987).
28.

WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DrcrIONARY 1685 (1983).
DOUBLEDAY ROGET'S THESAURUS IN DlcrIONARY FORM 638 (rev. ed. 1987).
WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DrcrIONARY 523 (1983).
DOUBLEDAY ROGET'S THESAURUS IN DrcrIONARY, FORM 194 (rev. ed.

E.g., ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7384, at 70-74.
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Moreover, it is black-letter insurance law that terms included
in grants of coverage are to be interpreted broadly so as to provide
the insured with the maximum coverage possible under the policy,
and further, that ambiguous policy terms (i.e., those that have more
than one reasonable interpretation) are to be construed in favor of
coverage and against the insurer-drafter. 29 Accordingly, the term
"bodily injury," which is, at best, ambiguously defined in EL poli
cies, should encompass emotional or mental distress even when un
accompanied by physical symptoms. 30
In addition, the difficulties in distinguishing between physical
and mental injuries should weigh the scales heavily in favor of find
ing coverage. The question of whether an emotional injury is a
bodily injury is a question of fact. "It involves a medical or psycho
logical problem of proof rather than purely a question of law."31
Recognizing just this point, courts otherwise inclined to find "bodily
injury" unambiguous have also held that this term may be ambigu
ous in light of certain facts or allegations and, accordingly, "should
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the al
leged injuries are sufficiently akin to physical injuries to render the
term 'bodily injury' ambiguous. "32
The case-by-case analysis is especially crucial in determining
whether there is a duty to defend. Because this broad duty is acti
vated if there is any potential liability covered under the policy,33
the absence of a well-developed factual record as to the nature and
extent of the claimant's alleged "bodily injuries" and the potential
ambiguity of "bodily injury" in light of certain facts that may be
developed should favor a finding of coverage for defense costS.34
29. See id. § 7401, at 197,219-27; § 7405, at 340; accord, e.g., Kent v. Middlesex
Mut. Assuran~ Co., 226 Conn. 427, 436 n.13, 627 A.2d 1319, 1324 n.13 (1993); Bateman
v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 527 Pa. 241, 245, 590 A.2d 281,283 (1991).
30. If further evidence of the ambiguity of "bodily injury" is needed, one need
look no further than the case of University of Illinois v. Continental Casualty Co., 234
III. App. 3d 340, 599 N.E.2d 1338 (1992), in which the defendant-insurer argued that
claims of mental anguish and emotional distress fell within the policy's definition of
"bodily injury" (i.e., "injury, sickness or disease") and accordingly were subject to an
exclusion for damages arising from bodily injury. The court rejected this argument and
found coverage for employment-related claims. Id. at 360-62, 599 N.E.2d at 1351-53.
31. Abellon v. Hartford Ins. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 852, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
32. SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188,204,607 A.2d
1266, 1274 (1992).
33. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275, 419 P.2d 168, 174-75
(1966) (en banc).
34. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Westchester Inv. Co., 721 F. Supp.
1165, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (applying California law and denying insurer's motion for
summary judgment on duty to defend under bodily injury coverage when evidence of
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2. "Accident"

EL policies' use of the undefined term "accident" in their
grants of coverage raises an important issue that is likely to be cov
erage-determinative in many cases involving employment-related
claims: from whose standpoint is an "accident" determined? As
with the undefined term "bodily injury," if any ambiguity or confu
sion is created by the insurers' failure to define this term under
black-letter rules of construction, it should be resolved in favor of
coverage. 35
It is remarkable that this issue should even be the subject of
litigation under the EL policy. The confusion as to the relevant
perspective or standpoint was one of the factors leading to the 1966
revision of the standard-form CGL policy from an "accident" basis
(which also did not specify the relevant standpoint) to an "occur
rence" basis (which did specify the relevant standpoint as being that
of the insured).~6 Thus, the lesson learned by CGL insurers some
thirty years ago appears to have been lost on contemporary EL in
surers, dooming them (and their policyholders) to litigation over an
ambiguous policy provision that could very easily have been made
clear through more careful drafting.
This omission has led to otherwise unnecessary litigation and a
split of judicial authority on the issue. In EEOC v. Southern Pub
lishing Co. ,37 two former employees of an EL policyholder alleged
that another employee "was guilty of 'continued and persistent
grabbing and touching of [one of the former employee's] private
physical manifestations of alleged emotional distress was developed in deposition
discovery}.
35. See APPLEMAN, supra note 15, and accompanying text.
36. See Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insur
ance, 18 THE ANNALS 197, 200 (1965) ("[A] number of cases have held, contrary to
intent, that the unexpected nature of the injury is to be determined from the point of
view of the injured party."); Lyman J. Baldwin, Jr., (Secretary-Underwriting of the In
surance Company of North America), Address to the American Society of Insurance
Management 1, 7 (Oct. 20, 1965) ("To the consternation of underwriters, a number of
past court decisions have applie[d] the concept of fortuity from the point of view of the
injured party. Such an unintended interpretation of coverage should not result from
the new language."); Richard H. Elliott (Secretary of the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters), The New Comprehensive General Liability Policy 1, 3 American Man
agement Association (1966) ("To the consternation of underwriters, a number of past
court decisions have applied the concept of fortuity from the point of view of the in
jured party. Such an unintended interpretation of coverage should not result from the
new language."). (lranscripts of these papers are on file with the authors.).
37. 705 F. Supp. 1213 (S.D. Miss. 1988), aff'd, 894 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1990).
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parts'" and that he "had committed assault and battery" on them. 38
One of the employees also alleged that the policyholder's president
had told her new employer that "she had sabotaged the office com
puter."39 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commisssion
("EEOC") brought claims fpr sexual harassment resulting in con
structive and retaliatory discharge, and the two former employees
intervened, alleging claims of slander and assault and battery.4o
The insured argued that its insurer had a duty to defend the
EEOC's harassment charges and the employees' tort claims under
the terms of an EL policy.41 The district court noted that the policy
did not define the term "accident" and did not define "from whose
viewpoint actions claimed to be accidental should be evaluated."42
The district court reasoned that "[w]hether or not the alleged as
sault and battery may be appropriately characterized as an accident
so as to bring. those claims within the ambit of coverage depends
upon from whose standpoint the conduct is viewed."43 Citing state
case law, and construing the ambiguity created by the policy's fail
ure to specify from whose viewpoint "accident" was to be deter
mined in favor of coverage for the policyholder, the district court
concluded that the determination of whether an injury is "acciden
tal" should be made from the injured person's perspective. Thus,
"[i]f the injury comes to [the victim] through external force, not of
[the victim's] choice or provocation, then as to [the victim] the in
.
jury is accidental."44
Applying this rule, the district court in Southern Publishing
held that, from the victims' standpoint, their injury from the assault
and battery was "accidental" because "the injury was the result of
external force," and the victims did not choose or provoke their
injury.45 Consequently, the court ruled that the EL policy poten
tially covered the assault and battery claims but not the slander
claim46 and found that the EL insurer had a duty to defend its poli
cyholder against the assault and battery claims. The district court
38. EEOC v. Southern Pub. Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting
the fOrnler employees' complaint).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Apparently, the defendant did not argue for insurance coverage of the harass
ment claim.
42. Southern Publishing, 705 F. Supp. at 1217.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Georgia Casualty Co. v. Alden Mills, 127 So. 555 (Miss. 1930».
45. Id. at 1217-18.
46. Id. at 1218.
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found that there was no possibility of coverage for the slander claim
under the policy's EL coverages because "certainly no bodily injury
resulted from the alleged slander."47 The court of appeals reversed
the district court's determination and found that the slander claims
were covered under the "personal injury and advertising liability
coverage" of the policy's general liability coverages. The court fur
ther found that the district court had erred in finding that coverage
for the slander claim was barred by the policy's exclusion for inten
tional acts because the claim against the policyholder alleged negli
gent slander as well as intentional slander.48
The district court refused to award the policyholder all of the
costs that it incurred in defending the action. Because the former
employees' tort claims were determined to have been barred by the
statute of limitations, the court was able to prorate the defense
costs between those claims and the non-covered harassment claims,
and did SO.49
In Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home, Co. v. Fireman's Insur
ance CO.50 a New York appellate court reached a contrary holding
on the "accident" issue addressed in Southern Publishing. In Mary
& Alice Ford, the policyholder sought coverage for a discrimination
claim based on disability under a general liability policy, an um
brella liability policy, and an EL policy. Although the EL policy's
coverage grant was worded similarly to the EL policy language at
issue in Southern Publishing ,51 the Mary & Alice Ford court failed
to recognize the ambiguity created by the language's failure to de
fine from whose standpoint the discrimination had to be an "acci
47. Ill. at 1219.
48. EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 790-91 (5th Cir. 1990).
49. Southern Publishing, 705 F. Supp. at 1219-20. Most courts have rejected this
position. When a legal action against an insured for which the insured seeks a defense
includes both covered and excluded claims, the insurer is required to defend the entire
lawsuit. See, e.g., Alert Centre, Inc. v. Alarm Protection Servs., Inc., 967 F.2d 161, 163
(5th Cir. 1992) (applying Louisiana law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 210, 213-14, 846 P.2d 792, 795-96, (Cal. 1993); Ruder & Finn, Inc. v. Seaboard
Sur. Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 669-70, 422 N.E.2d 518, 521 (1981); see also Heffernan & Co. v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 418 Pa. 326, 331-32, 614 A.2d 295, 298 (1992) (finding that the duty to
defend is triggered when the potential for a covered claim being made against the poli
cyholder became apparent, even if the only claims which were actually ever made were
excluded from coverage). The "suit" language in the EL policy provision is substan
tially similar to the duty to defend language in the liability pOlicies at issue in the cases
cited above. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50. 446 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 57 N.Y.2d 656, 439 N.E.2d 883
(1982).
51. Compare Mary & Alice Ford, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 600 with Southern Publishing,
705 F. Supp. at 1217.
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dent." Despite the fact that the court noted that the "multifaceted
term 'accident' is not given a narrow technical definition by the
law,"52 it concluded that the "casualty" should be looked ~t "from
the point of view of the insured, to see whether or not, from his
point of view, it was unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen."53
The court reasoned that the employee's alleged injuries "were
unexpected and unforeseen by ... the insured" because they flowed
"directly" from the insured's "intentional discriminatory prac
tice."54 Accordingly, the court held that proof of discrimination
would "necessarily establish that there was no accident within the
meaning of the insurance policies in question," and hence the in
surer was not obligated to defend or indemnify the employer. 55
Although the court's determination of "accident" from the
point of view of the EL policyholder in Mary & Alice Ford effected
a denial of coverage on the facts before the court, such a rule will
often promote coverage in the context of employment-related
claims. Often, employment-related claims are responses to the al
leged discriminatory, harassing, or otherwise tortious acts of fellow
employees who are without significant administrative or policymak
ing authority within the corporate employer and who have acted
without authority or the approval of the corporation. If the corpo
rate insured's responsible effective management did not know of,
condone, ratify, or consciously adopt such conduct, the conduct
would still be an accident from the standpoint of the corporate poli
cyholder.56 One of the principal reasons policyholders, especially
large corporate policyholders, purchase liability insurance is to pro
tect themselves from the unlawful acts of their employees. The fact
that an employee acted with the intent to cause injury should not of
itself necessarily bar the corporation from coverage. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized, pre
cluding a policyholder from coverage whenever it is vicariously lia
ble for an employee's conduct would ma~e "the comprehensive
liability policy illusory for corporate purposes. "57
52. Mary & Alice Ford, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (citation omitted).
53. Id. (relying on Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 358 N.E.2d 258
(1976); McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y.2d 358, 329 N.E.2d 172 (1975».
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Thrlock, 216 Cal. Rptr. 796, 804-05
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188,213
14, 607 A.2d 1266, 1279 (1992).
57. Dart Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1973)
(applying California law); cf. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs.
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Only when the insured's responsible effective management
knows of or condones unlawful discriminatory or harassing conduct
should coverage be precluded for want of an "accident." For exam
ple, in Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance Co. ,58 no
coverage was available for a former employee's claims of sexual
harassment and wrongful termination against the policyholder,
when the sexual harassment was allegedly perpetrated by the poli
cyholder's president, and the president's "sexual misconduct with
female employees was known to, and ratified by, the board of
directors. "59
3. "As Damages"
Insurers have attempted to deny coverage for back pay awards
to employees by contending that these awards are an equitable
remedy and hence that they are not covered "damages," i.e., mone
tary relief awardable through an action at law triable to a jury. Sig
nificantly, insurance companies themselves have rejected this
argument when they, as policyholders, have sought coverage for
their employment-related liabilities. In Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,60 a federal district
court, at the urging of the plaintiff, rejected the "hypertechnical dis
tinction between damages and equitable relief" advanced by the de
fendant-insurers, and determined that the term "damages" should
be "construed in accord with the plain meaning of the term and the
reasonable expectations of the insured."61 Accordingly, the court
and Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Texas law and determining
that an individual employer's sexual harassment of an employee was "neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured" within the meaning of a CGL policy's
occurrence definition, even though that individual was one of three named insureds
under the policy, because there was "no contention" that either of the other insureds
expected or intended to injure the employee); Seminole Point Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 675 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.N.H. 1987) (The court held that there was
no coverage for the corporation president's intentional sexual harassment of employ
ees. However, the court found that the insurer was liable for defense costs for the
president's employer, the hospital, because the president's acts were not authorized by
or done for the benefit of the hospital, and the hospital faced independent liability for
its negligence.); Streamline Bar, Inc. v. GRE Am., No. C9-93-451, 1993 WL 290276
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1993) (finding coverage for an employer's vicarious liability for
its employee's acts of sexual harassment). The drafting history of the "occurrence"
language confirms and supports this argument. See Scheuermann & Baillie, supra note
3, at § 11B.02[2][aJ[iH].
58. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, review denied, (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
59. Id. at 699.
60. 650 F. Supp. 1553 (W.O. Pa. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law).
61. Id. at 1560.
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found that the general liability insurance policies at issue provided
coverage for back pay awards that the policyholder-insurer was re
quired to pay to remedy discriminatory employment practices. 62
This holding is consistent with the vast majority of courts that have
addressed the "damages" issue in environmental insurance cover
age disputes. 63
In contrast, a distinct minority of courts have accepted the
"hypertechnical distinction" between legal and equitable forms of
relief advanced by insurers in the context of employment-related
claims. Thus, in School District of Shorewood v. Wausau Insurance
COS.,64 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin employed that distinction
to defeat coverage for defense costs incurred in connection with a
discrimination' claim seeking attorneys' fees and injunctive relief
that would have required the policyholder to reorganize and adopt
new hiring practices to remedy past discrimination. Contrary to
overwhelming case law,65 the court reasoned: "[I]n the insurance
context, the term 'damages' has an accepted technical meaning in
law."66 Although the court acknowledged that the words in an in~
surance contract mean "not what the insurer intended the words to
mean but what a reasonable person in the position of an insured
would have understood the words to mean,"67 it disregarded that
rule in adopting the technical distinction between law and equity.68
62. Id. The "as damages" language which was at issue in Liberty Mutual is no
different than the "as damages" language which typically appears in EL policies.
Although there do not appear to be any cases construing such language in the specific
context of an EL policy, the language should be construed similarly in favor of coverage
regardless of the type of policy it appears in.
63. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253 (1990);
Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 782, 625 A.2d 1021, 1033
(1993); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 700;
555 N.E.2d 576, 583 (1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869;
886-87,784 P.2d 507,515 (1990); but see, e.g., Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois,
573 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Me. 1990) (environmental remediation costs not "damages").
64. 170 Wis. 2d 347, 488 N.W.2d 82 (1992).
65. Id. at 368 n.61 (citations omitted).
66. Shorewood, 170 Wis. 2d at 367-68, 488 N.W.2d at 89.
67. Id.
68. Another case often cited by insurers to support their argument that "dam
ages" means only "legal damages" in the context of employment-related claims, Mary
land Cup Corp. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 81 Md. App. 518, 568
A.2d 1129 (1990), may no longer be good law in light of the opinion of Maryland's
highest court in Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 330 Md. 758, 625
A.2d 1021 (1993). In Maryland Cup, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals accepted
the technical distinction between legal damages and equitable relief and denied cover
age to a policyholder for claims made under Title VII alleging discriminatory employ~
ment practices urged on it by the insurer. Subsequently, Maryland's highest court
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"Employee of the Insured"

The "employee of the insured" language in the EL coverage
grant gives rise to two issues: first, who is an "employee" and sec
ond, who is the "insured." EL coverage will be forthcoming only if
the underlying claim arises out of an employment relationship be
tween the plaintiff and an insured employer. Courts have rejected
EL policyholders' arguments that EL coverage exists for employ
ment claims that arise outside of an employment relationship be
tween an insured employer and its employees. For example, in
Producers' Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Insurance Co. ,69 the Cali
fornia Supreme Court determined that there was no possibility of
coverage under a WCIEL policy that insured Producers Dairy and
its subsidiary, LAS Corporation, for a negligence claim brought
against Producers Dairy by an LAS employee who was injured on
the job.7° The court reasoned that "Producers' liability to [the LAS
employee] was not based on any employment relationship between
them, but arose instead from Producers' negligent maintenance of
its delivery truck"71 and explicitly declined to recognize that cover
age might be available under the EL policy "when a negligence
claim is made against an 'insured' (Producers), by an employee of
~n 'insured' (LAS)."72 The court further reasoned: "[A] reasonable
person in the position of an officer of Producers would not disre
gard the fact that legally Producers and LAS were each separate
entities, and accordingly that person would not assume coverage
existed under Producers' employers' liability policy where the po
tential plaintiff is not a Producers' employee."73
Whether the claimant in the underlying case is an "employee"
is a question which often will be determined by state law and stat
utes.74 Courts in the various states have identified factors which are
used to determine whether an employer-employee relationship ex
ists. In Savoie v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. ,75 a Louisiana ap
effectively, but sub silentio, rejected Maryland Cup's interpretation of "damages" and
held that the equitable remedies that were sought by a state agency against an alleged
polluter under the state's environmental laws and regulations were "damages" as that
term appeared in the insured's general liability policy. See id. at 7fr2, 625 A.2d at 1033.
69. 41 Cal. 3d 903, 718 P.2d 920 (1986).
70. [d. at 907, 718 P.2d at 921.
71. [d. at 913, 718 P.2d at 926.
72. [d. at 911, 718 P.2d at 924.
73. [d. at 913, 718 P.2d at 925.
74. See 11 RONALD A. ANDERSON, CoUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 44.73, at 252
(rev. ed. 19fr2 & Supp. 1995).
75. 339 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App. 1976), affd, 347 So. 2d 188 (La. 1977).
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pellate court determined that no employment relationship existed
between two cousins (who were also neighbors) who frequently
helped one another with farm work because neither one had the
right to exercise any control over the other's actions; no wages were
paid, nor was there any agreement for wages or compensation; and
"[t]hey had no definite agreement with respect to what was actually
being exchanged by the parties or the value thereof, nor was there
any obligation between them in this connection."76
Courts have split on the issue of whether unsuccessful job ap
plicants who are injured during the application process or a tryout
period are "employees."77 In jurisdictions where job applicants
may be "employees," EL insurance coverage may be available for
claims brought by applicants who allege that they have been dis
criminated against on an impermissible basis in a hiring decision.
5.

"Arising Out of and in the Course of His Employment"

For there to be coverage for an employment-related claim
under an EL policy, the injury that is the subject of the claim must
have arisen out of or occurred in the course of the claimant's em
ployment. The issue created by such ambiguous language is that of
determining the causal nexus between the employment and the al
leged injury.78 .
Under well-established rules of construction, grants of cover
age are to be interpreted broadly and in favor of coverage,79 while
restrictions and exclusions are to be interpreted narrowly and
strictly against the insurer.80 Accordingly, the "arising out of" lan
guage in the EL insurance coverage grant should be understood to
76. Id. at 917.
77. Compare Sellers v. City of Abbeville, 458 So. 2d 592, 593 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
(denying workers' compensation to police officer who lost his job after failing a civil
service test and was injured while warming up for an agility test in connection with his
application for re-employment, because he was not an "employee" when injured), writ
denied, 462 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1985) with Erickson v. Holland, 295 N.W.2d 576, 579-80
(Minn. 1980) (awarding workers' compensation to truck driver injured while taking a
performance test as part of a formal prerequisite for employment with a trucking firm,
because the evidence in the record showed that the applicant would be (and was) paid
for his time during the test and because he was under the control and supervision of the
employer).
78. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recognized that the policy term "arising
out of' is "extremely broad ... so broad, in fact, that it is difficult to conceive of a rule
that draws a justifiable line between coverage and no coverage at any reasonable
point." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watts, 811 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Tenn. 1991).
79. See generally ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7401, at 197.
80. See id., § 7405, at 340.
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encompass any bodily injury that has any type of causal nexus with
the claimant's employment. 81 Thus, while this coverage grant in
cludes relations of proximate causation between the employment
and the bodily injury, it is not limited to such causal relationships.82
These principles are illustrated by Forum Insurance Co. v. Al
lied Security, Inc. 83 The underlying claim iIi Allied Security was
brought against the employerlEL policyholder, Allied Security, by
the estate of a former employee who was killed by another em
ployee while both were on assignment for Allied Security.84 The
jury in the underlying action determined that the deceased was
killed for personal reasons "not directed against the victim as an
employee or because of his employment."85 Allied Security's gen
eral liability insurer, Forum Insurance Company, provided a de
fense under a reservation of rights, and brought a declaratory
judgment action against the employer's EL insurer, Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company, to establish Liberty Mutual's obligation to de
fend and indemnify Allied Security.86 The existence of EL cover
age hinged on whether the slain employee's death "[arose] out of
and in the course of his employment by the insured. "87 The court
determined that the EL policy language at issue was unambiguous
as a matter of law and that "'[bJut for' causation, i.e., a cause and
result relationship, is enough to satisfy this provision of the pol
81. See, e.g., Lumbennens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., 23 F.3d 970, 979 (6th
Cir.1994).
82. Id. at 980. Another aspect of the policy language "arising out of and in the
course of employment" also bears mention in the context of insurance coverage for
employment-related claims. Applied properly, black-letter rules of policy interpreta
tion would require the "arising out of and in the course of' language as used in the
"employment exclusion" and sometimes included in general liability insurance policies
to be construed to exclude coverage only when the employment relationship proxi
mately causes the employee's claim. See generally Scheuennann & Baillie, supra note
3, at § llB.02[2][i] n.66 and accompanying text. For a number of reasons, proximate
causation may not exist in the context of an employment-related claim. Id. at llB-30
31. Accordingly, coverage for an employment-related claim might be provided by both
an employer's EL insurance and its general liability insurer, even if the latter is subject
to an "employment exclusion." Cf, Eichelberger v. Warner, 290 Pa. Super. 269, 434
A.2d 747 (1981) (construing "arising out of' broadly in the context of the grant of cov
erage of a auto insurance policy and narrowly in the context of an exclusion in a home
owner's policy and finding that coverage for liabilities associated with one accident was
available under both policies).
83. 866 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying Pennsylvania law).
84. Id. at 83.
85. Id. at 81.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 81-82.
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icy."88 Accordingly, the court found that the employee's death
"clearly arose out of his employment ... since he was killed by a
fellow employee while both were on assignment as security guards
for their employer"89 and thus that Liberty Mutual was obligated to
bear part of the cost of the defense of the claim against Allied Se
curity, as the claim was potentially covered under Forum's policy as
well as Liberty Mutual's policy.90
The United States Court of Appealsfor the Sixth Circuit has
held that under the coverage grant of an EL policy even an inten
tional tort that an employer commits against an employee may
"arise out of and in the course of" employment. In Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Co. v. S-W Industries, Inc. ,91 a worker, Carl Viock,
contracted lung disease as the result of being exposed to toxic
fumes and dust on the job. In Viock's tort action against his em
ployer, the jury determined that the employer had acted with a
"presumed intent," but not a specific intent, to injure Viock.92 The
employer's EL insurers denied coverage, contending that "an inten
tional tort by one's employer cannot possibly 'arise out of and in
the course' of [one's] employment."93 The Sixth Circuit rejected
that contention:
It is undisputed that Viock's injuries were caused by his long
term exposure to toxic chemicals and congestive dusts at his

work. But for his job, there is no question that Viock would not
have sustained these injuries. It strains credulity, therefore, for
the appellee-insurers in this case to contend that these injuries
did not "arise ou(of and in the course of" Viock's employment. 94

Accordingly, the court found coverage under the EL policies for
Viock's claim.95
B.

Possible Applicable Exclusions

EL policies may incorporate exclusions that in some circum-'
stances may bar coverage wholly or in part for employment-related
88.
(1967».
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 82 (relying on McCabe v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 228 A.2d 901, 903
Id. at 83.
Id. at 85.
23 F.3d 970 (6th Cir.) (applying Ohio law), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 190 (1994).
Id. at 973-74.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. at 980.
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claims. These include the employment exclusion and the contract
exclusion.
1.

The EL Policy's Employment Exclusion

EL policies often conta4t some form of employment exclusion.
For example, an EL policy may contain an exclusion for" 'damages
arising out of the ... discrimination against any employee in viola
tion of law. "'96 The judicial response to such exclusions has· been
mixed.
Two cases which have found coverage for employment-related
claims under EL policies despite such exclusions are worth discus
sion. In EEOC v. Southern Publishing Co. ,97 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that an EL policy
provided coverage for claims of assault and battery and "negligent
slander" brought against an employer by two employees. The Fifth
Circuit found that the allegations of "continued and persistent grab
bing," "assault and battery," and "physical pain" that the employ
ees suffered were sufficient to allege "bodily injury" under the
policy.98 The court rejected the insurer's argument that the bodily
injury claims were not covered because they were nothing more
than evidence of alleged discrimination, and the policy excluded
"'damages arising out of the discharge of, coercion of, or discrimi
nation against any employee in violation of law."'99 The court ruled
that the bodily injury claims were sufficiently distinct from the Title
VII claims so as to not fall within this exclusion. loo With respect to
the alleged slander of an employee by the employer, the court de
termined that the policy provided coverage for slander unless it was
intentional,1Ol Because the complaint against the employer alleged
that the slander may have been "stated with gross and reckless dis- .
regard of the truth," the policy provided coverage for the slander
96. Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 729
(Iowa 1993) (quoting the employer's liability policy issued by State Farm) (alterations
in original) (determining that such an exclusion barred coverage for claims grounded on
unlawful sex discrimination); Commercial Union Policy, supra note 12, (containing an
exclusion applicable to "damages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotion, evalua
tion, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination or
termination of any employee, or any personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions").
97. 894 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Mississippi law).
98. Id. at 789.
99. Id. (quoting the workers' compensation and employers' liability policy issued
by Southern Guaranty).
100. Id. at 791.
101. Id.
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claim.102
Seminole Point Hospital Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. 103 also provides an example of a court's finding coverage for an
employment-related claim under an EL policy. In Seminole Point,
two employees of the hospital-EL policyholder filed suits against
the hospital, two officer-directors of the hospital, and several other
hospital employees, alleging failure to supervise by the hospital and
sexual harassment by the officer-directors. 104 The court held that
no coverage was available to the officer-directors under the hospi
tal's EL policies.1 05 One officer-director was denied coverage be
cause he was not a named insured. The court determined that
coverage for the other was precluded by the EL policy's exclusion
for discriminatory acts and its exclusion for "bodily injury inten
tionally caused or aggravated by [the policyholder]."106 The court
ruled, however, that coverage was available to the hospital for the
employee's claims of failure to supervise. Because the alleged acts
of sexual harassment were not authorized by the hospital and not
done to benefit the hospital, the officer-directors were acting
outside the scope of their authority, and their intent thus could not
be imputed to the hospital.l07
Taking a different direction, the Iowa Supreme Court in Ot
tumwa Housing Authority v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. ,108 held
that a discrimination exclusion in an EL policy completely barred
coverage for claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retali
ation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.l09 The EL policy contained
an exclusion for "'damages arising out of the . . . discrimination
against any employee in violation of the law."'llo The c~urt held,
without any discussion or analysis, that because the claimants' theo
ries of recovery "are grounded on sex discrimination in violation of
state and federal law," the exclusion "clearly applies."111 In so
holding, in cursory fashion, the court seems to have been influenced
102. Id. at 790-91.
103. 675 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.H. 1987) (applying New Hampshire law).
104. Id. at 45.
105. Id. at 47.
106. Id. at 45 (alteration in original).
107. Id. at 47.
108. 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993).
109. Id. at 727.
110. Id. at 729 (quoting the employer's liability policy issued by State Farm) (al
teration in original).
111.. Id.
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by its sintilar finding that the employment exclusion in the policy
holder's general liability policy barred coverage for the same
claims.
2.

The Contract Exclusion

EL policies, like most other types of liability insurance policies,
usually exclude coverage for amounts that the insured owes pursu
ant to a contractual obligation,112 In the context of coverage for
employment-related claims, the issue created by such language is
whether back pay awards have been made pursuant to a contractual
obligation. Again, judicial interpretations of such exclusions are
mixed, but the trend is to find coverage for back pay awards,
notwithstanding the exclusions. Although there do not appear to
be any court decisions construing the EL policy's "contract exclu
sion," the language of that exclusion is substantially the same as the
contract exclusions that appear in other liability policies.
Thus, for example, in New Madrid County Reorganized School
District No.1, Enlarged v. Continental Casualty Co. ,113 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an E&O
policy's contract exclusion did not bar coverage for back wages
awarded in connection with a suit alleging violations of employees'
civil rights because the suit was not purely a contract action.114
On similar facts, in School District for City of Royal Oak v.
Continental Casualty Co. ,115 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit recognized that "an exclusion of liability insurance
coverage for contractually assumed obligations to third parties is
operative only where the insured would not have been liable to the
third party absent the insured's agreement to pay."116 The Sixth
Circuit rejected the insurer's argument that the contract exclusion
barred coverage because the applicable collective bargaining agree
ment prohibited certain types of discrimination, the employee did
not sue the policyholder for breaching that agreement, and the
claims in her complaint against the policyholder did not depend on
the agreement. 117
Similarly, in Andover Newton Theological School, Inc. v. Conti
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See, e.g., Commercial Union Policy, supra note 12.
904 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 199O).
Id. at 1241.
912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 199O) (applying Michigan law).
Id. at 847.
Id.
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nental Casualty CO.,l1S the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit determined that the contract exclusion did not bar cov
erage of liability for age discrimination pursuant to the ADEA, de
spite a jury's finding that the employee's employment contract was
breached. The court ruled that the exclusion was inoperative be
cause the imposition of liability on the policyholder pursuant to the
ADEA "did not depend on the existence of an underlying contract,
but only on the existence of an ongoing employment
relationship. "119
On the other hand, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Anne Arun
del Community College,12° the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit upheld a jury's determination that this exclusion
barred coverage for a back pay award for civil rights violations, rea
soning that although the exclusion's applicability to back pay
awards was ambiguous, there was enough extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent in the record to permit the jury's determination. l21
The court of appeals declined to detail the evidence of the parties'
intent upon which the jury based its determination. 122
II.

COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED CLAIMS UNDER
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS POLICIES (INCLUDING
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY
POLICIES)

Like EL policies, there is no standard form E&O policy.123
Hence, E&O policies include language that differs more or less
markedly from insurer to insurer. Nonetheless, because a number
of issues recur in E&O coverage litigation, certain generalizations
can be made about the employment-related claims coverage af
forded by E&O policies. These issues include: (a) who is insured
under a policy; (b) what amounts to a claim made against the in
sured; (c) whether an E&O policy covers claims of intentional dis
crimination against the insured; (d) whether the insured's liabilities
are "damages" under the policy; and (e) whether the E&O policy's
"contract exclusion" bars coverage for back pay awards. This sec
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

930 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Massachusetts law).
Id. at 94.
867 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying Maryland law).
Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 804.
See International Risk Management Institute, Inc., DIREcrORS AND OF
FICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE CoVERAGE ANALYSIS X.E.I. (1990) (hereinafter, "IRI,
D&O Coverage").
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tion discusses each of the first three issues as they arise in the con
text of coverage for employment-related claims. Issues (d) and (e)
above arise under policy language substantially the same as that
used in EL and other types of policies, and therefore, should be
resolved in a similar manner under E&O policies.124
A.

The Insured Issue

A typical insuring agreement in an E&O policy provides:
The Company shall pay on behalf of the Insured Person all loss
for which the Insured Person is not indemnified by the Insured
Organization and which the Insured Person becomes legally obli
gated to pay on account of any claim made against him, individu
ally or otherwise ... for a Wrongful Act committed, attempted,
or allegedly committed or attempted, by the Insured Person
125

E&O policies also often provide complementary coverage for any
losses that an insured organization incurs in indemnifying its direc
tors or officers. The following language is typical of such comple
mentary insuring agreements:
This policy shall reimburse the Company for Loss arising from
any claim or claims which are first made against the Directors or
Officers ... for any alleged Wrongful Act in their respective ca
pacities as Directors or Officers of the Company, but only when
and to the extent that the Company has indemnified the Direc
tors or Officers for such Loss ... ,126

Notably, these insuring agreements provide coverage only for
liabilities arising out of claims of wrongful acts made against "in
sured persons" or "directors and officers." With respect to E&O
policies that include such language, a claim against an organization
or entity only may not be covered under the policy.
For example, in Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters
at Lloyd's London,127 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's determination that under
California law and the language of certain E&O policies issued to
124. See supra parts 1.A.3. and I.B.2 for a discussion of these issues.
125. Chubb Insurance Company, Executive Liability and Indemnification Policy,
14-02-0494 (January 1985), reprinted in IRI, D&O Coverage, supra note 123, at XE.2.
126. National Union Fire Insurance Company, Directors and Officers Insurance
and Company Reimbursement Policy 47353 (August 1988), reprinted in IRI, D&O
COVERAGE, supra note 123, at X.E.3.
127. 991 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1993).
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the Olympic Club, there was no coverage for the Club's defense
costs associated with suits alleging race and gender discrimination
by the Club and fifty unnamed "Doe defendants." The court re
jected the Club's argument that a claim of unlawful discrimination
against the Club necessarily was a claim against the Club's officers,
directors, or employees. 128 The court reasoned that the Club's dis
criminatory policies could have been carried out by its members
rather than its officers, directors, or employees;129 that neither the
complaints against the Club nor the Club's by-laws established who
created the Club's allegedly discriminatory policies;130 and that the
complaints were made against the Club itself, not against the Club
as principal of its directors, officers, or employees under a theory of
imputed liability.131 The court also rejected the Club's argument
that because one of the underlying complaints alleged that the
Club's discriminatory acts were performed by the "defendants," in
cluding the fifty unnamed "Doe defendants," that complaint gave
rise to the insured persons' potential liability for the alleged dis
criminatory acts.132
The court's denial of coverage for defense costs does not rest
easily with the well-established California rule that the duty to de
fend is activated if there is any potential for coverage for the allega
tions in a complaint. 133 The Ninth Circuit apparently ignored that
rule when it denied coverage, based in part, on its finding that the
complaint's "ambiguous" identification of the "Doe defendants"
did not "establish" that those unnamed defendants were the Club's
directors, officers, or employees. l34
The premise underlying the holding in Olympic Club-namely,
that when an E&O policy provides coverage only for the wrongful
acts of an organization's directors, officers, or employees it does not
also provide coverage to the organization for its own wrongful
acts-may have been correct. However, as the dissent noted, the
majority's decision was more likely a reaction to the "Club's unsym
pathetic stance"135 as an alleged perpetrator of unlawful discrimina
128. Id. at 500. By endorsement, the policies at issue covered "losses" from
wrongful acts done by the Club's officers, directors, or employees. Id. at 499.
129. Id. at 500.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 500-01.
132. Id. at 501.
133. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 274, 419 P.2d 168, 174-75 (1966).
134. Olympic Club, 991 F.2d at 501.
135. Id. at 507 (Reinhart, J., dissenting).
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tion, than the product of careful interpretation of the policies, the
complaints, and the applicable law.
B.

The "Claim" or "Suit" Issue

As indicated by the insuring agreements set forth in the previ
ous subsection, E&O policies typically provide defense or indem
nity coverage for "claiins" or "suits" against insureds. These terms
occasionally are defined in. E&O policies. For example, an E&O
policy form used by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company defines a
"claim" as an "adjudicatory proceeding in a court of law or equity
brought against any of the Insured Persons which seeks actual mon
etary damages or other relief and which may result in a loss under
this Policy, including appeal from such adjudicatory proceeding."136
When the term "claim" or "suit" is not defined by policies, insurers
often argue that an informal complaint or the institution of an ad
ministrative action against an insured does not constitute a "claim"
or a "SUit."137 In such cases, courts have construed those terms con
sistently with the hornbook rules of policy construction that the un
defined terms of an insurance contract are to be given their plain
and ordinary meanings138 and that insuring agreements are to be
construed liberally and in favor of coverage. 139
The implications of this approach are potentially significant. In
some cases, coverage is promoted by a finding that an administra
tive action or other demand is a "claim" or "suit," while in other
cases it is not. When the underlying demand, claim, or suit was
made or brought and whether the policy is an occurrence or claims
made policy are the principal factors influencing whether policy
holders or insurers will argue whether a demand, claim, or suit con
stitutes a "claim" or "suit" as these terms are found in a policy.
136. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Designated Insured Persons and
Company Reimbursement Policy, F-1458-a (November 1986), reprinted in, IRI, 0&0
Coverage, supra note 123, at V.E. 34.
137. Virtually the same issue arises dramatically under CGL policies in environ
mental insurance coverage cases. Courts have overwhelmingly held that potentially re
sponsible party ("PRP") letters, which commence administrative proceedings by federal
or state environmental agencies against policyholders, are "suits" which activate the
duty to defend. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 769,
625 A.2d 1021, 1026-27 (1993); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity and Quar.
Co., 407 Mass. 689, 695, 555 N.E.2d 576, 581 (1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Indus
trial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 153-54,388 S.E.2d 557, 570 (1990); but see,
e.g., Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16,20 (Me. 1990) (determining
that a clean-up order issued to a policyholder by a state agency was not a "suit").
138. See ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7384, at 70-74.
139. [d., § 7401, at 197.
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Thus, for example, in Community Unit School District No.5 Coun
ties of Whiteside and Lee v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 140 an
Illinois intermediate appellate court determined that a complaint
filed with the ("EEOC") and the Illinois Fair Employment Practice
Commission alleging that an E&O policyholder engaged in race
and sex discrimination against a disappointed job applicant and
seeking money damages· and injunctive relief was a "civil suit"
within the coverage of an E&O policy.1 41 Apparently, the term
"civil suit" was not defined in the pOlicy.142 In reaching its determi
nation, the court recognized that because the terms "claim" and
"suit" are both commonly understood to mean "an attempt to gain
legal redress or to enforce a right"143 and because the common
meanings of "claim" and "suit" are not restricted to "legal actions
in the common law courts,"144 proceedings before administrative or
quasi-judicial tribunals are "claims" or "suits."
In contrast, in Bensalem Township v. Western World Insurance
Co. ,145 a federal district court, interpreted the undefined policy
term "claim" in a claims-made policy and considered whether a let
ter from the EEOC to an E&O policyholder requesting certain in
formation and notifying the policyholder that a charge of age
discrimination had been filed against it was not a "claim" under the
E&b policy. The court reasoned that because the EEOC's letter
did not demand anything from the policyholder, it was not a
"claim," as that term is commonly understood.1 46 The EEOC letter
and information request was made prior to the inception of the pol
icy at issue.1 47 A later, more explicit demand from the EEOC was
asserted during the policy period, and the court found that this de
mand constituted a "claim" within the meaning of the policy.148
Thus, the court ruled, the policy provided defense coverage for the
later "claim."149
C.

Intentional Discrimination

In the context of employment-related claims, a claim of inten
140. 95 III. App. 3d 272, 419 N.E.2d 1257 (1981).
141. Id. at 279, 419 N.E.2d at 1261-62.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 279, 419 N.E.2d at 1261.
144. Id.
145. 609 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law).
146. Id. at 1349.
147. Id. at 1347.
148. Id. at 1349.
149. See, e.g., ApPLEMAN, supra note 15, § 7401, at 197.
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tional discrimination, or "disparate treatment," involves an allega
tion that an employer intentionally treated an employee less
favorably than other employees on the basis of a protected classifi
cation, e.g., race, religion, nationality, or sex.150 Courts have deter
mined that the definition of "Wrongful Act" in E&O policies
permits coverage for claims of disparate treatment. "Wrongful
Act" is often defined as: "any actual or alleged error, misstatement,
misleading statement, act or omission, or neglect or breach of duty
by the Directors or Officers in the discharge of their duties solely by
reason of their being Directors or Officers of the Company."151
Courts finding coverage under this language have reasoned
that such language must be enforced as written, and that insurers
that do not want to provide coverage for acts of intentional discrim
ination could have drafted the definition of "Wrongful Act" to state
that expressly, or could have excluded such intentional acts from
coverage explicitly.152
The above-quoted policy language has been distinguished from
another typical definition of "Wrongful Act," which provides cover
age only for "negligent" acts, errors, omissions, misstatements, or
misleading statements. Certain courts interpreting this definition of
"Wrongful Act" have determined that such language bars coverage
for claims of intentional discrimination. 153
III.

CONCLUSION

Employers of all types and sizes have faced, and will continue
to face, an onslaught of employment-related claims. Traditional
150. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1977).
151. CNA Insurance Company, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Pol
icy, G-11126-4 (October 1983), reprinted in IRI, D&O COVERAGE, supra note 123, at
X.E.4.
The definition of "Wrongful Act" set forth above may not permit coverage for
claims made against "directors or officers" by virtue of their conduct outside their ca
pacities as directors and officers. See Bowie v. Home Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 705, 708-09 (9th
Cir. 1991) (affirming district court's determination under California law that an E&O
insurer had no duty to defend its policyholder's directors in a suit filed against them in
connection with their capacities as directors of another company).
152. See, e.g., New Madrid County Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. I, Enlarged v.
Continental Casualty Co., 904 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Missouri
law); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 515
N.W.2d 576, 580 (Minn. 1994).
153. See, e.g., Golf Course Superintendants Ass'n v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 761 F. Supp. 1485,1489-90 (D. Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law); School Dist.
No.1, Multnomah County v. Mission Ins. Co., 58 Or. App. 692, 701, 650 P.2d 929, 935
36 (1982).
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types of liability insurance purchased by employers, including EL
insurance and E&O insurance, often provide coverage for such
claims. Employers would do well to ascertain the extent to which
their EL and E&O policies may provide coverage for the employ
ment-related claims that have been or might be, made against them
before deciding to bear the cost of such claims themselves or
purchasing additional (and perhaps unnecessary) insurance to se
cure such coverage.

